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Privatization and Political Power in Representative Democracy 
Or 
Contracting and its Consequences for Political Power in Representative 
Democracy 
 
Morten Balle Hansen 
 
Since the 1980s a global trend in Public Management Reform has been an attempt to enhance various types of 
Market Type Mechanisms (MTMs) in the provision of public services. One  
 
 
One of the main endeavors within ”New Public Management” (NPM) since the 1980s has been to encourage 
various forms of privatization in the public sector. In recent years, the involvement of private players in the 
provision of services in Danish municipalities has thus been increased, which makes it important to study the 
consequences of this development. In the present article, privatization is understood as the use of private service 
providers to provide services and focus is on what privatization means for the power of local political players. 
The point of departure is an expectation that a high degree of privatization can have far-reaching consequences 
for the distribution of local political power. This is illustrated empirically by a questionnaire survey of 896 
municipal leaders. The main findings are that the local political actors generally have less power in 
municipalities with high degrees of privatization and that the power that remains is more centralized in these 
municipalities.  
 
Introduction 
 
“Many western democracies are currently implementing governance reform and administrative reform without 
much reflection of its broader democratic ramifications. … If there is anything to be learned from recent 
administrative and governance reform, it should be that democracy and administration are integrated processes 
where reform in one process will impact the other.” (Pierre 2009) 
 
The use of the market mechanism is a central element of the public management reforms of 
recent decades. Together with the tendency to emphasize management and the tendency to 
emphasize result assessment in the public sector it forms a trinity that has been termed “New 
Public Management” (NPM) (Christensen and Laegreid 2007; Hood 1991). NPM, understood 
as the prioritization of one or more of these three elements, has increasingly characterized 
management thinking in the public sector in many OECD countries since the early 1980s. Yet 
the significance of this way of thinking for the actual management practice of the public 
sector is much discussed and varies from country to country.  
In combination with the development of information and communication technology 
(ICT), NPM-inspired organizational innovations have made their mark for better or for worse 
on the wave of administrative reforms that have characterized the public sector in OECD 
countries in general and Denmark more specifically since the 1980s (Ejersbo and Greve 
2005; Hansen forthcoming 2010). Indeed, one of the rationales behind the Danish structural 
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reform was to increase the municipalities’ administrative capacity for handling contract 
management and other organizational innovations. This is not revolutionary in that the new 
forms of governance coexist with and are embedded in older forms of governance, but 
significant and occasionally paradoxical and conflict-ridden transformations of governance of 
the public sector have taken place.  
In spite of this development, the existing knowledge of the consequences of these 
measures is very limited. In particular, the relation between the use of the NPM measures and 
the division of power among the political players remains largely unexplored. The present 
article begins to fill this gap through an analysis of the division of power in local 
representative democracy. Power is to be understood here as a given player’s influence on the 
municipality’s activities. More specifically, the connection is explored between local political 
players’ power and the degree of privatization, understood as the extent to which the 
municipalities include private players in the municipalities’ service provision. The local 
political players are first and foremost politicians (the mayor, the financial committee, and 
the other politicians),  but the top administrative managers and local interest groups are also 
included in the analysis. Focus is thus on the specific empirical relation between two classic 
institutions in our society: the market and democracy. The question is whether greater use of 
private service providers means greater power for the local political players or whether it 
rather leads to a technocratization and hollowing out of local democracy.  
After a brief discussion of the literature on the rationales, consequences and 
organization of privatization, two hypotheses are formulated on the consequences of the 
degree of privatization on the power of local political players. Then the data and methods 
used in the study are described, after which the results are presented. In connection with this 
other possible interpretations of the results of the study are discussed. Finally, a conclusion is 
drawn and various implications of the study are discussed.  
 
Privatization, democracy and power 
Notions of a free market and a representative democracy as pillars of a modern society were 
the starting point for the social order that developed in Europe in the 1800s in the wake of the 
French and the American revolutions. Today they are to a great extent ”sacred institutions” in 
the modern social order in the sense that the goals of a well-functioning democracy and a free 
market form the basis for prevailing global notions of the good society (as expressed, for 
example, in the OECD’s and EU's criteria for membership) (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and 
Ramirez 1997). The relations between these central institutions have been the object of many 
3 
 
analyses over time (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Hirschman 1970; Schumpeter 1942), and 
especially Hirschman’s analyses of the dynamic relations between the “voice” mechanism of 
democracy and the “exit” mechanism of the market are relevant in relation to the focus of this 
article.  
The article takes as its starting point the notion that the use of market mechanisms in 
public management leads to an erosion of democracy. Focus is on a form of the hollowing-
out thesis that was formulated by Rod Rhodes in the wake of the many privatizations and 
reorganizations of the Thatcher era (Rhodes 1994). The thesis, which is developed below, is 
that privatization has consequences for the organization of public management and that in 
turn, the changed organization of management brings about a considerable change in the 
power of local political players. Before this thesis is explored in more depth, the following 
section will briefly explain the main rationales for privatization and review previous 
empirical research on the consequences of privatization. 
 
Rationales for privatization 
What are the advantages that can be gained from a higher degree of privatization? The 
literature on privatization is comprehensive and a wide range of explicit and implicit 
objectives have been proposed (Hodge 2000; Savas 2000). The various objectives are 
connected to the fact that the concept of privatization covers several phenomena. If 
privatization is understood as the exposure to competition through the creation of quasi-
markets in which there is competition between various service providers (private and public), 
the objectives of increased economic efficiency will dominate. Privatization in this sense 
implies that there is more than one service provider and it introduces decision structures 
based on the “exit” mechanism of the market (Hirschman 1970). By this is understood the 
users’ possibility to switch to a new service provider if they are dissatisfied with the service. 
In contrast to this is the “voice” mechanism, which dominated the Danish public sector until 
two or three decades ago. “Voice” consists in users and citizens being given the opportunity 
to express their opinions on public sector services and in that way indirectly affect public 
services. With the introduction of “exit” the monopoly of the public sector on essential 
welfare services is broken and the increased competition is expected to encourage efficient 
service provision (Varian 2006). However, this is seldom the only objective of exposure to 
competition. As Alam & Pacher (2000) write, it can also be about reducing costs, developing 
clearer objectives, listening to user preferences and improving the quality of output.  
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In relation to these objectives it is important to distinguish between the privatization 
itself and any possible effect of choice for users. Privatization takes place when tenders are 
invited for public services and private service providers win the right to provide (some of) the 
services. If there is more than one player (public or private) that is awarded the right to 
provide services, users have a choice between various service providers. This is not 
necessarily a consequence of privatization in that municipalities can choose to let one single 
private service provider provide all services, but most often the municipalities choose a 
solution with several service providers. In this case, users have a real ”exit” opportunity to 
”vote with their feet” if their are dissatisfied and there is increased pressure on the service 
providers’ ability to adapt to user demands.  
 
Consequences of privatization 
Despite the high profile of privatization on the reform agenda, analyses of the consequences 
of privatization have been relatively scarce and have primarily focused on economic 
consequences (e.g. cost level and productivity) for technical service areas in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Boyne 1998; Hodge 2000). There are however a few analyses of non-technical 
service areas (Hansen 2010; Meier and O'Toole 2009). The results of the analyses are mixed, 
but in general, privatization does not seem to have the marked positive effect on productivity 
that theories on exposure to competition suggest (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, and Tinkler 
2006). Empirical analyses of other types of consequences than the economic are rarer (Hodge 
2000). Some researchers have analyzed the relation between privatization and corruption 
(Donahue 1989; Kobrak 2002) on the basis of a theory that corruption may become a greater 
problem in privatization regimes. Other researchers have analyzed the relation between 
accountability and privatization (Gilmour and Jensen 1998) on the basis of a theory that 
privatization will lead to a loss of accountability and uncertainty about the division of 
responsibility between the private service providers and the public purchasers. Yet as far as 
can be determined, and after searches in the Web of Science and other databases, there are no 
previous empirical analyses that focus on the consequences of privatization for the local 
democracy and the power of local players.  
 
The organization of privatization 
The thesis here is that when municipal task performance is increasingly privatized, this has 
consequences for how influence can be exercised in the local democracy, understood here as 
the representatives of the formal democracy. There are other forms of local democracy in the 
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form of, for example, local councils and user committees, but here, the analyses is restricted 
to classic representative democracy with a municipal council elected by the people, which 
constitutes itself with a mayor, a financial committee and a standing committee. It is the 
players in and around this decision support system that are in focus. The expectation is that 
privatization has an impact on how decisions can be made and how municipalities can be 
governed. Put simply, privatization is expected to lead to a transfer of power from the 
political, democratic system to those who negotiate with private service providers. If 
privatization also means that there is more than one choice for users, users can also be 
expected to have more power. 
Put in a more nuanced way, the establishment of quasi-markets in previous areas of 
public monopoly requires an adjustment of the way in which decisions are made in the local 
democracy. To ensure equal competition between public and private service providers in the 
outsourcing process, a transparent, legally binding contract must be formulated (Greve 2008). 
If the outsourcing process entails competition between a municipal service provider and one 
or more private service providers, a clear division must be made within the municipal 
organization between an a unit that orders a service (an authority) and a unit that carries out 
the order (a service provider) (O'Flynn and Alford 2008). Versions of external contract 
management and (if there are both private and public suppliers) Purchaser-Provider Models 
(PPM) are necessary organizational preconditions if privatization is to function. In this sense, 
one could speak of a special organizational configuration (Mintzberg 1979), a management 
technology or a special privatization regime, which must be developed to handle this form of 
privatization. It is in this sense that the term privatization regime is used in the following. 
 
Odysseus and the sirens 
Because contracting out confines the duty of contractors to the performance of the terms of contracts 
and confines the right of supervising principals to enforcing the terms of contracts, it rules out the 
possibility of day-to-day supervision and intervention which is part of the normal practice within 
bureaucracies and indeed within any organisation of employees serving a common employer (Mulgan 
1997) 
 
Just as Odysseus had to be tied to the mast to prevent himself from being lured by the sirens’ 
song, so must municipal politicians and management be subject to uncompromising contract 
management discipline if privatization is to function. Increased privatization means that the 
negotiation of binding external contracts gains importance in the execution of municipal tasks 
(Greve 2008). Moreover, external contracts are often negotiated for a number of years and 
within the contact period, the role of the municipal council and administration is reduced to 
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monitoring whether the contract is complied with. Citizens, users and local interest 
organizations who approach municipal politicians or the municipal administration with 
complaints or to express dissatisfaction must be asked to wait until the next time the contract 
is negotiated or until a technical-legal investigation is conducted of whether the contract has 
been complied with. However, if privatization means that there is more than one supplier of 
public services, users have the opportunity to select another supplier than one they are 
dissatisfied with. Politicians, on the other hand, do not have as many possibilities of 
influencing the production of public services during the contract period. The overall thesis of 
this article is therefore that the local political players have less decision-making power in 
municipalities where large parts of the operations are privatized compared with 
municipalities where this is not the case. 
 
H1: The higher the degree of privatization, the less power the local political players’ 
have. 
 
There is also reason to expect a different division of power in the municipal political system 
in municipalities with a high degree of privatization compared with municipalities with a low 
degree of privatization. The entire contract negotiation and control process that is connected 
to a privatization regime requires legal and professional competences that few part-time 
politicians possess. Therefore, it is likely that especially ordinary “amateur politicians” will 
have less power in this type of regime. Given that interest groups among other things exercise 
influence through politicians (Binderkrantz, 2005), they must also be expected to be 
relatively weaker in municipalities that have a high degree of privatization.  
On the other hand, full-time politicians like the mayor can be expected to be relatively 
stronger. Other things being equal, the mayor is the single politician who has the best 
information on the contract management process and who has the best possibilities in terms 
of resources (e.g. in the form of time and assistance from council officers) to exercise 
influence. Other leading politicians, such as the various committee chairs, will probably have 
less power in municipalities with a high degree of contract management compared with 
municipalities with a low degree of contract management. A privatization regime is as a rule 
accompanied by a focus on stringent financial control and resulting centralization, and 
principles for contract management must be dealt with in the financial committee. This means 
that the members of the financial committee can be expected to have greater influence in 
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municipalities with a high degree of privatization compared with municipalities with a low 
degree of privatization. 
The impact of the top administrative managers’ influence can go both ways. On the 
one hand, the possibility to exercise direct management is more limited in municipalities with 
a high degree of privatization, but on the other hand, the top administrative managers, by 
virtue of their professional insight, must be expected to be highly competent to exercise 
influence in the contract management process in these municipalities. It is also conceivable 
that the two effects neutralize one another and that the top administrative managers’ power 
remains therefore on the whole relatively unchanged. These considerations lead to 
Hypothesis 2, which is further broken down into a number of sub-hypotheses. 
 
H2: Power in municipalities with a high degree of privatization is more centralized 
than power in municipalities with a low degree of privatization:  
H2a: The mayor has greater power in municipalities with a high degree of 
privatization than in municipalities with a low degree of privatization 
H2b: The financial committee has greater power in municipalities with a high 
degree of privatization than in municipalities with a low degree of 
privatization  
H2c: Top administrative managers have the same power in municipalities with 
high and municipalities with low degrees of privatization 
H2d: Politicians who are not members of the financial committee have less 
power in municipalities with a high degree of privatization than in 
municipalities with a low degree of privatization 
H2e: Local interest groups have less power in municipalities with a high 
degree of privatization than in municipalities with a low degree of 
privatization 
  
Data and method 
The data sources used are on the one hand, a questionnaire survey conducted from October-
November 2008 and on the other hand, a number of municipal key figures calculated by the 
Ministry of Interior and Statistics Denmark. In this way, the independent variable (degree of 
privatization) is measured using register data while the measurement of the dependent 
variable (the power of local political players) is based on a subjective assessment made by the 
municipal managers. The managers are thus used as informants about the actual distribution 
of power, and this results in certain problems of validity, which are most serious in relation to 
the assessment of their own power (R6 in Table 1 below). However, this source of error in 
measurement cannot be expected to be correlated with the degree of privatization of the 
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municipality and, as will be discussed below, the control variables take the differences in the 
respondents’ job situations into account. 
More specifically, the respondents in the questionnaire survey are members of the 
associations of municipal managers: the Association of Municipal Chief Executives 
(Kommunaldirektørforeningen), the Association of Directors in the Field of Children's. 
Educational and Cultural Matters (Børne- og Kulturchefforeningen), the Confederation of 
Danish Municipal Engineers (Kommunalteknisk Chefforening), and the Association of Social 
Directors in Denmark (Foreningen af Socialchefer). Of the 1105 members, 81.1 % (n=896) 
have responded to the questionnaire, including 75.5 % (n=74) of the municipal chief 
executives (KD), 82.7 % (n=81) of directors in the field of children’s, educational and 
cultural matters (BKD), 71.4 % (n=70) of the municipal engineers (TD) and 76.5 % (n=75) of 
the social directors (SD) in Denmark. In addition, 168 other administrative managers, 407 
other municipal managers, and 21 respondents whose titles are unknown have participated. 
The survey can be regarded as reasonably representative of the top municipal executives in 
Denmark after the municipal reform (Hansen, Jensen, and Pedersen 2009). 
The indicators of the local political actors’ power are from the questionnaire survey. Seven 
measurements for the various groups of players of their degree of influence on the activities 
of the municipality have thus been constructed (see Table 1). One is a general summative 
index, which measures the overall influence of 14 different categories of players connected 
with the local political system (R1); the other six are variables that measure the influence of 
the mayor (R2), the financial committee (R3), leading politicians (R4), ordinary politicians 
(R5), top administrative managers (R6), and local interest groups (R7). Four of these seven 
variables are constructed as a summative index (see Table 1) with a reasonable scale 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha 0.69-0.78). 
 
 
 
*** Omkring her tabel 1*** 
 
 
 
The indicator of the degree of privatization (PLI) has been taken from the Ministry of 
Interior’s key figures. The PLI for 2007 has been used such that it is the relation between the 
degree of privatization in 2007 and the power of the local political players in 2008 that is 
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examined in the models. PLI is calculated as the share of the municipalities’ use of private 
service providers in percent of that part of the municipalities’ total service provision that may 
be carried out by private service providers (see also appendix). A score of 100 would thus 
indicate that all services that may according to law by provided by private service providers 
are actually carried out by them. A score of 0 would indicate that none of these tasks are 
carried out by private service providers.  
In addition to the indicator of privatization, six control variables have been used in the 
analyses presented below. There are two groups of control variables. The first group takes 
into account that the respondents (the municipal managers, who, as mentioned, are used as 
informants on the distribution of power) have different starting points for their assessment of 
the local political players’ power. It is among other things highly relevant to look at the 
respondents’ positions because respondents will have different possibilities to see how power 
relations are played out depending on whether they are chief executives or not. Their 
education may also play a part, and it is checked whether or not they have taken a higher 
education in the social sciences, as respondents with this type of education typically have a 
greater theoretical basis for assessing power. Finally, gender is checked (woman or not) 
because existing research shows that women managers often orient themselves toward the 
broader environment rather than toward the hierarchy (Damanpour & Schneider 2009: 502). 
This can have an impact on their assessment of the power of local political players. 
The second group of control variables takes into account the fact that other 
characteristics of the municipality than the degree of privatization may affect the distribution 
of power. More specifically, two variables for the size of the municipality are included (less 
than 20,000 inhabitants or not; over 100,000 inhabitants or not) because larger municipalities 
have more ’ordinary’ politicians, a situation that can shift the distribution of power between 
these and other players, as well as a variable that indicates the municipality’s relative wealth 
(tax base). The latter has been included to check whether the members of the financial 
committee  may possibly have greater influence in cash-strapped municipalities. In addition, 
the analyses have been checked for a large number of other variables that are not shown on 
the tables. Among others, dummy variables for whether the mayor was from Venstre, the 
Liberal Party of Denmark, or not or from Socialdemokratiet, the Danish Social Democrats, or 
not have been included and all these analyses consistently show that the connection between 
the degree of privatization and the power of local political players does not change. The 
results of the analyses can therefore be said to be robust toward various model specifications. 
Descriptive statistics of all variables included in the analysis are shown in Table 2.  
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*** Omkring her tabel 2 *** 
 
 
Table 2 shows how the municipal managers on average assess various players’ political 
influence in the municipality (R1-7). Not surprisingly, the mayor is assessed to have 
definitely the greatest influence (4.78), followed by the financial committee (4.42), the top 
administrative managers (4.15), leading politicians (3.68), ordinary politicians (2.67) and 
local interest groups (2.64). The statistics for the private service provider indicator (E1) show 
that between 16.1 % and 32.8 % of the tasks were classified as privatized in 2007 and that the 
average was 23.39 %. Moreover, 7 % of the respondents are municipal chief executives (E2),  
23 % are educated in the social sciences (E3), 32 % are women (E4), 3 % work in 
municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants (E5), 11 % work in municipalities with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants (E6), and the average tax based in 2007 (E7) was 143,910 DKK.  
 
Results 
Table 3 presents the bivariate correlations between the variables used in the analysis. Most 
interesting is the correlation between the private service provider indicator (E1) and the 
influence indicators (R1-R7). With the exception of the correlation with the assessed 
influence of the mayor (R2), all correlations between the power measures and the degree of 
privatization are negative and the correlations are statistically significant (p<0.05) for the 
influence of all groups of players (R1), the index for leading politicians’ influence (R4), the 
ordinary politicians’ influence (R5), the index for the top administrative managers’ influence 
(R6) and the index for the local interest groups’ influence (R7). The correlations for the 
mayor’s influence (R2) and the influence of the financial committees (R3) are not significant. 
Before any statements can be made on the hypotheses, the connections must be verified using 
multiple regressions including the relevant control variables. 
*** Omkring her tabel 3 ***  
Table 4 shows OLS regressions because more advanced analyses have shown that it is 
unproblematic to use these even though the dependent variables cannot assume values under 
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1 or over 5. All models have thus been tested in a Tobit regression analysis with two-sided 
censoring of the minimum and maximum. This analysis is especially relevant in this study 
since some of the dependent variables (in particular, the assessment of the mayor’s power) 
are quite skewed in the sense that many assess this power as very high (see Table 2). The 
average is thus close to the absolute maximum value. Yet since the result was the same with 
regard to the relation between privatization and power, the simple OLS regressions are 
presented here. 
 
*** Tabel 4 omkring her *** 
 
The relationships between the degree of privatization (F1) and the indicators of political 
influence (model R1-R7) show the same tendency in the multivariate analyses as in the 
bivariate analyses, although the strength of the connections has changed somewhat. The 
multivariate analysis thus indicates that it is the ordinary politicians who show the greatest 
difference in influence when municipalities with high and low degrees of privatization are 
compared (model R5). The multivariate analysis thus indicates support for the hypothesis that 
the higher the degree of privatization, the less power the local political players have (H1). 
Also the expectation that other leading politicians (model R4), ordinary politicians (model 
R5) and local interest groups (model R7) will have less influence finds support in the 
multivariate analysis. However, the expectations that the mayor (model R2) and the financial 
committee (model R3) will have greater influence the higher the degree of privatization 
cannot be confirmed. The influence of these two categories of players is the only one that is 
not significantly related to the degree of privatization. Nor can the expectation that the 
influence of top administrative managers will remain unchanged (H2b) be confirmed (model 
R6). The administrative manager’s influence is significantly negatively related to the degree 
of privatization. Given the fact that the influence of all groups of players (aside from the 
mayor and the financial committee) is significantly negatively related to privatization, the 
results do, however, support the main expectation in hypothesis 2 that a higher degree of 
privatization is connected with the centralization of influence in the local political system. 
Table 5 (below) summarizes how the results relate to the hypotheses and sub-hypotheses. 
Finally, it should be noted that the coefficient of determination of the seven models is not 
very high in that R2 varies between 0.09 (model R7) and 0.011 (model R6).  
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TABEL 5 HER. 
 
Discussion 
Overall, the results of the empirical analyses can be interpreted as a confirmation of the 
general expectations that were put forward in hypotheses 1 and 2. The degree of privatization 
in the municipalities is significantly negatively related to the municipal managers’ assessment 
of the power of most political players. The two surprises are that the assessment of the power 
of the mayor and of the financial committee is not significantly related to the degree of 
privatization, and that there is a negative connection between the degree of privatization and 
the power of the top municipal managers. 
For the mayor and the financial committee, an obvious interpretation is that the 
increased power these two groups of players theoretically have as a result of a more 
centralized decision structure in a privatization regime is counteracted by the general 
tendency that the local representative democracy is weakened when there is a high degree of 
privatization.  
A corresponding interpretation can be applied to the negative relation that is found 
between the assessment of the power of the top municipal managers and privatization. The 
hypothesis was that the top administrative managers’ power will on the whole remain 
uninfluenced by the degree of privatization. The argument was that even though top 
managers in municipalities with a high degree of privatization have poorer opportunities for 
direct intervention because of the contract relation, this is counteracted by the fact that they 
have good possibilities of influencing the contracts due to their professional expertise and 
their function as the designers, supervisors and interpreters of the contract management 
system. As mentioned, privatization can lead to users having more power if the introduction 
of private players gives users freedom of choice between several service providers. This 
increased user power may reduce the top managers’ possibilities of influencing the 
production of services because service providers are guided by the users’ needs rather than 
the municipal managers’ wishes. Moreover, the direct power of orders may be experienced as 
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greater than the indirect power of experts. However, this cannot be clarified without further 
studies as the current study does not include measurements of users’ influence.  
Overall, the study shows first, that local political players in general have less power in 
municipalities with a high degree of privatization than in municipalities with a low degree of 
privatization. This, however, does not necessarily mean that citizens have less power. In 
particular, if the citizens are users of a specific service, they will be able to influence the 
production of this service if privatization in connected with freedom of choice between 
various service providers. Provided that dissatisfied users can choose another service 
provider, this strengthens what Hirschman terms the exit option. Yet in this context this may 
happen at the expense of the voice option since the results could suggest that the benefit of 
complaining to the member of the local council is less in municipalities with a high degree of 
privatization. In somewhat slogan-like terms, one could say that there is less citizen 
democracy in municipalities with a high degree of privatization bur more user democracy.  
Second, the study shows that the power of the local political players is more 
centralized in municipalities with a high degree of privatization. The power in these 
municipalities is more concentrated on the mayor and the financial committee. They do not 
have greater influence than their mayor/financial committee colleagues in municipalities with 
a low degree of privatization, but the other groups of players in municipalities with a high 
degree of privatization have considerably less power. It is debatable whether this constitutes a 
problem. In any case, it raises the question of what the role of the many ordinary politicians 
in the local democratic process should be. The role of the ombudsman can thus be harder to 
play in a contract management regime, and the legal and financial expertise that is normally 
required to exercise influence in the contract management process is seldom found in part-
time politicians. 
Finally, it should be noted that the coefficient of determination of the models is very 
low. This indicates that there are variables that have not been included that are important for 
understanding differences in influence. This does not however change the conclusions of this 
article as long as these variables do not affect both the degree of privatization and the 
influence of local political players. It must also be emphasized that the study is based on 
municipal managers’ assessment of the influence of local political players. Whether these 
results would hold true if other types of data and indicators were used must remain to be 
shown by future research projects. 
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Despite the limitations of the analysis, the article is clearly relevant from the point of 
view of society to the question of the role of municipalities in the public sector. This classic 
issue within the literature on municipal research (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995) is also 
dealt with in Greves og Ejersbo’s article in this special issue (Greve and Ejersbo 2010). 
Should municipalities first and foremost function as efficient implementation organs for 
national government decisions or is the role of the municipalities primarily to be the bearers 
and representatives of a vibrant local democracy (Goldsmith, Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 
1995)? How should the balance between the national parliamentary management chain 
(Olsen 1978) and its local counterpart be? In relation to these questions, the article 
contributes with the message that initiatives like privatization can have an impact on the 
power of local political players and thereby also on who gets what in the municipalities. 
These  – unintentional? – consequences should be taken into account in future whenever the 
introduction of similar initiatives is being considered. 
 
Conclusion 
The privatization of municipal activities has been an important endeavor in the government’s 
agreements with Local Government Denmark (LGDK) in recent years. For decades it has 
been a central tendency in public management reforms in both Denmark and internationally 
in the OECD countries – especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This means that we 
increasingly can begin to analyze both the intentional and the unintentional consequences of 
this privatization. Previous analyses have primarily focuses on financial performance at the 
organizational level. The have been carried out first and foremost in the USA and other 
Anglo-Saxon countries, and they have furthermore primarily focused on technical services 
and in particular, refuse collection and disposal. 
This article has focused on one consequence that has not been illustrated in previous 
studies. What significance does the degree of privatization have for the exercise of influence 
in the local representative democracy? The empirical study lends support to theoretical 
arguments that local political players generally have less power in municipalities with a high 
degree of privatization compared with municipalities with a lower degree of privatization and 
that the remaining local political power is more centralized in the former. 
 
 
15 
 
References 
Binderkrantz, A., 2005. "Organisationerne og indflydelsen: Hvordan interesseorganisationer 
søger indflydelse på offentlig politik", politica, 37(1), 76-94. 
Boyne, G. A. 1998. Public Choice Theory and Local Government : A Comparative Analysis 
of the UK and the USA. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy: Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Christensen, T. and P. Laegreid. 2007. "Transcending new public management: the 
transformation of public sector reforms ". Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Donahue, J. D. 1989. The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Dunleavy, P., H. Margetts, S. Bastow, and J. Tinkler. 2006. "New public management is dead 
- long live digital-era governance." Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 16:467-494. 
Ejersbo, N. and C. Greve. 2005. Moderniseringen af den offentlige sektor., Edited by K. K. 
Klausen and S. Hildebrandt. Copenhagen: Børsens Forlag. 
Gilmour, R. S. and L. S. Jensen. 1998. "Reinventing government accountability: Public 
functions, privatization, and the meaning of "state action"." Public Administration 
Review 58:247-258. 
Goldsmith, M., D. Judge, G. Stoker, and H. Wolman. 1995. "Autonomy and city limits." Pp. 
228-252 in Theories of Urban Politics. London: Sage. 
Greve, C. 2008. Contracting for Public Services, Edited by S. P. Osborne, O. Hughes, and W. 
J. M. Kickert. London: Routledge. 
Greve, C. and N. Ejersbo. 2010. "Kontraktstyring i kommunerne." Politica 2. 
Hansen, M. B. 2010. "Marketization and Economic Performance. Competitive Tendering in 
the Social Sector." Public Management Review 12:255-274. 
—. forthcoming 2010. "Antecedents of Organizational Innovation. The Diffusion of New Public 
Management into Danish Local Government." Public Administration. 
Hansen, M. B., C. P. Jensen, and J. T. Pedersen. 2009. "Kommunernes administrative 
lederskab efter kommunalreformen. Spørgeskemaundersøgelse til medlemmerne af de 
kommunale chefforeninger, efteråret 2008." Syddansk Universitet, Institut for 
Statskundskab, Odense. 
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hodge, G. 2000. Privatization. An International Review of Performance, Edited by P. 
Sabatier. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Hood, C. 1991. "A Public Management for All Seasons." Public Administration 69:3-19. 
Judge, David, Gerry Stoker, and Harold Wolman. 1995. Theories of Urban Politics. London: 
SAGE Publications. 
Kobrak, P. 2002. Cozy Politics: political parties, campaign finance, and compromised 
governance. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Riener Publishers. 
Meier, K. J. and L. J. O'Toole. 2009. "The Proverbs of New Public Management Lessons 
From an Evidence-Based Research Agenda." American Review of Public 
Administration 39:4-22. 
Meyer, J. W., J. Boli, G. M. Thomas, and F. O. Ramirez. 1997. "World society and the 
nation-state." American Journal of Sociology 103:144-181. 
Mintzberg, Henry. 1979. Structuring of organizations. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
Mulgan, R. 1997. "Contracting out and accountability." Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 56:106-116. 
O'Flynn, J. and J. Alford. 2008. "The separation/specification dilemma in contracting: The 
local government experience in Victoria." Public Administration 86:205-224. 
16 
 
Olsen, Johan P. 1978. Politisk Organisering. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Pierre, J. 2009. "Reinventing governance, reinventing democracy?" Policy and Politics 
37:591-609. 
Rhodes, R. A. W. 1994. "The Hollowing Out of the State - The Changing Nature of the 
Public-Service in Britain." Political Quarterly 65:138-151. 
Savas , E.S. 2000. Privatization and public-private partnerships. New York: Chatham House. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Varian, H. R. 2006. Intermediate microeconomics: a modern approach. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co. 
 
 
  
17 
 
Table 1: Measurements of political influence (the dependent variables) 
The question in the questionnaire survey was formulated as follows: ”On the background of 
your experience as Head of Administration in the municipality, please make a personal 
assessment of how much influence the following players have on the activities of the 
municipality. 1=no influence; ... ;5=great influence”. 
R1 Influence of all political 
players. Summative index*, 
Cronbach’s alpha=0.78 
1. Mayor; 2. Committee chairs; 3. Other chairs in the 
municipal council; 4. Financial committee; 5. Group 
chairs; 6.Ordinary municipal council members; 7. 
Administrative managers; 8. Municipal chief 
executive; 9. Local members of the Danish 
Parliament; 10. Trade union leaders; 11. The media; 
12. The private business sector; 13. Volunteer 
organizations; 14. Special interest groups 
R2 Mayor’s influence The mayor 
R3 Financial committee’s 
influence 
The financial committee 
R4 Leading politicians’ 
influence. Aggregate index*. 
Cronbach’s alpha=0.74 
Committee chairs; other chairs in the municipal council; 
group chairs. 
R5 Ordinary politicians’ 
influence. 
Ordinary politicians. 
R6 Top administrative 
managers’ influence. 
Aggregate index*. 
Cronbach’s alpha=0.69 
Administrative managers; municipal chief executive. 
R7 Local interest groups’ 
influence. Aggregate index*. 
Cronbach’s alpha=0.76 
Local members of the Danish Parliament; trade union leaders; 
the media; the private business sector; volunteer 
organizations; special interest groups 
*The figures of the index variables are added together and divided by the number of variables 
that are included in the index in question  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for all variables included 
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maksimum 
     
R1 Influence index all players 3.37 0.42 2 4.57 
R2 Mayor’s influnce 4.78 0.57 1 5 
R3 Financial committee’s influence 4.42 0.74 1 5 
R4 Leading politicians’ influence index 3.68 0.70 1 5 
R5 Ordinary politicians’ influence 2.67 0.69 1 5 
R6 Top administrative managers’ 
influence index 
4.15 0.66 1 5 
R7 Local interest groups’ indfluence 
indexs 
2.64 0.56 1 4.57 
E1 Private service provider indicator 
2007 
23.29 3.21 16.1 32.8 
E2 Municiapl chief executive 0.07 0.25 0 1 
E3 Higher education in the social sciences 0.23 0.42 0 1 
E4 Woman 0.32 0.47 0 1 
E5 Less than 20,000 inhabitants 0.03 0.17 0 1 
E6 More than 100,000 inhabitants 0.11 0.31 0 1 
E7 Municipality’s tax base (wealth 
indicator) 
143,910 26,836 115,004 263,523 
R= Response variables (dependent variables); E= Explanatory variables (independent 
variables) 
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Table 3: Bivariate Pearson correlations for all included variables 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7   
R1 All players’ 
influence 
1              
R2 Mayor’s influence 0.309 1             
R3 Financial 
committee’s influence 
0.522 0.202 1            
R4 Leading 
politicians’ influence 
0.706 0.197 0.443 1           
R5 Ordinary 
politicians’ influence 
0.479 0.053 0.295 0.473 1          
R6 Top administrative 
managers’ influence 
0.499 0.241 0.237 0.241 0.141 1         
R7 Local int.groups’ 
indfluence  
0.798 0.083* 0.219 0.283 0.210 0.194 1        
E1 Private service 
provider indicator 
2007 
-0.158 0.046 -0.046 -0.124 -0.118 -0.089* -0.119 1       
E2 Municipal chief 
executive 
-0.170 0.029 -0.141 -0.113 -0.100 -0.013 -0.170 0.013 1      
E3 Soc.Sci.Educ. -0.165 0.020 -0.128 -0.133 -0.131 0.018 -0.177 0.015 0.257 1     
E4 Woman 0.089* -0.113 0.083 0.026 0.096 -0.042 0.130 0.066 -0.151 -0.030 1    
E5 Less than 20,000 
inhabitants 
0.006 0.064 -0.008 0.014 0.045 0.023 -.007 0.017  0.086 -0.002 -0.037 1   
E6 More than 100,000 
inhabitants 
0.049 -0.025 -0.018 -0.020 -0.012 -0.016 0.087* 0.046 -0.034 0.096 0.015 -0.059 1  
E7 Municpality’s tax 
base 2007 
-0.129 -0.006 -0.025 -0.126 -0.068 0.006 -0.117 0.313 -0.012 0.017 0.031 0.036 -0.062* 1 
*Correlation is significant at level of 0.05. Bold: Correlation is significant at a level of 0.01.  
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Table 4: The effect of privatization of the influence of political players 
Multiple 
OLS regression 
R1.  
Index all 
political 
players 
R2.  
Mayor 
R3.  
Financial 
comm. 
R4.  
Index 
Leading 
politicians 
R5.  
Ord. 
politicians 
R6.  
Index 
Top 
admin. 
managers 
R7 
Index 
Local 
stakeholde
rs 
E1. Degree of 
privatization 2007 
-0.130**  0.059 -0.035 -0.089* -0.107** -0.096* -0.090* 
E2. Municipal chief 
executive 
-0.122** -0.007 -0.106** -0.082* -0.058 -0.011 -0.110** 
E3. Higher educ. in the 
soc.sciences 
-0.132***  0.027 -0.103** -0.108** -0.105** -0.016 -0.153*** 
E4. Woman  0.070^ -0.120**  0.062^  0.012  0.093* -0.040  0.111** 
E5. Less than 20,000 
inhabitants 
 0.043  0.058  0.007  0.040  0.062^  0.024  0.031 
E6. More than 100,000 
inhabitants 
 0.059 -0.027 -0.009 -0.014  0.001 -0.005  0.106** 
E7. Municipality’s tax 
base (wealth indicator) 
-0.088* -0.028 -0.013 -0.104** -0.041  0.034 -0.079* 
N 722 775 772 756 766 767 738 
R2 0.084  0.022  0.036  0.049  0.046  0.011  0.090 
Adjusted R2 0.075  0.013  0.027  0.040  0.038  0.002  0.081 
Note: Coefficients of standardized regressions.  
Level of significance marked with: ^p<0,1 *p<0,05 **p<0,01 ***p<0,001 
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Table 5: Overview of hypotheses and sub-hypotheses and their status in relation to 
acceptance/rejection 
H1 The higher the degree of privatization, the less power 
the local political players’ have 
Accepted 
H2 Power in municipalities with a high degree of 
privatization is more centralized than power in 
municipalities with a low degree of privatization 
Partially accepted (with 
reservation due to the 
rejection of H2a, H2b and 
H2c) 
H2a The mayor has greater power in municipalities with a 
high degree of privatization than in municipalities with a 
low degree of privatization 
Rejected (no relationship) 
H2b The financial committee has greater power in 
municipalities with a high degree of privatization than in 
municipalities with a low degree of privatization  
Rejected (no relationship) 
H2c Top administrative managers have the same power in 
municipalities with high and municipalities with low 
degrees of privatization 
Rejected (no relationship) 
H2d Politicians who are not members of the financial 
committee have less power in municipalities with a high 
degree of privatization than in municipalities with a low 
degree of privatization 
Accepted 
H2e Local interest groups have less power in municipalities 
with a high degree of privatization than in municipalities 
with a low degree of privatization 
Accepted 
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Appendix: Definitions of the explanatory (independent) variables included in the 
analysis 
E1. Private service provider indicator 
2007 
The indicator is a calculation of the 
municipality’s share of private service providers 
in percent of the expenditures on private service 
providers that may be paid according to 
legislation. Based on accounting figures.  
E2. Municipal chief executive 1=Municipal chief executive;  
0=Other type of manager 
E3. Higher education in the social 
sciences (law, economics, political 
science, etc.) 
1=Higher educ. in soc. sciences  
0=No higher educ. in the soc. sciences 
E4. Woman 1=Woman; 0=Man 
E5. Municipalities with 20,000 
inhabitants or less 
1=20,000 or less inhabitants 
0=More than 20,000 inhabitants 
E6. Municipalities with 100,000 
inhabitants or more 
1=100,000 or more inhabitants 
0=Less than 100,000 inhabitants 
E7. Municipality’s tax basis per 
inhabitant 2007 
The municipality’s budgeted tax basis per 
inhabitant  
 
 
 
